NFRC Response to Construction products Reform White Paper

The views set out here reflect feedback gathered from across our membership during a webinar held on 12 May 2026, from written contributions submitted by members ahead of that event, and from NFRC's own policy analysis. We have coordinated with our supplier and contractor members throughout, and the positions set out below seek to represent the breadth of interests within our membership, including those who manufacture, distribute, specify, and install roofing and cladding products.

NFRC broadly supports the objectives of these reforms. The Grenfell Tower tragedy made clear that the construction products regulatory regime was not working. We accept the need for substantive change, and we are committed to engaging constructively to help make that change effective. However, the strength of our support is conditional on the reforms being properly proportionate, being supported by adequate guidance and lead-in time, and being implemented in a way that does not disproportionately burden SMEs or expose contractors to liabilities they cannot reasonably discharge.

Construction Products Reform White Paper:

Question 1: What should be included in guidance to support industry to understand their responsibilities regarding products critical to safe construction?

NFRC Response: Detailed guidance is essential and must be published well in advance of any obligations coming into force. National Federation of Roofing Contractors members have significant concerns about how the category of 'products critical to safe construction' will operate in practice, and we have a direct stake in how it is defined, given that roofing and cladding products are at the forefront of building safety regulation following the Grenfell Tower Inquiry.

Defining what is 'critical'

The White Paper states that this category will be a 'limited' number of products, and that the national regulator for construction products will determine which products and systems fall within it. We note, however, that roofing and cladding systems will likely be highly represented in this category, and our members anticipate that a significant range of the roofing and cladding products and assemblies they produce and install will be caught by safety-critical scenarios as defined under the regime.

We support a nuanced, context-driven approach to determining criticality, and we agree that the end-use application and the failure risk to life should be the determining factors, rather than a blunt product category approach. Nevertheless, the guidance must be explicit and detailed enough that manufacturers, contractors, and specifiers can determine with confidence whether a given product in each application will be treated as critical. Uncertainty on this point creates significant risk of unintended liability exposure.

Amongst NFRC Members there was a discussion on whether all roofing and cladding products should be considered safety critical by default due to the reliance placed upon them for safeguarding inhabitants. Asked whether all roofing and cladding components should be considered critical to safe construction, approximately 50% of NFRC Members said yes, 20% said no, and the rest were unsure. This demonstrates industry’s willingness to abide by the enhanced requirements on these products, so long as they are proportionately implemented.

Content of guidance

Guidance to support industry should include the following as a minimum:

• A clear decision-making framework that allows any party in the supply chain to determine whether a product or system in a given application constitutes a safety-critical scenario. Explicit here should be details around failure conditions, and what constitutes failure.
• Explicit guidance on how the regulations apply where multiple products combine to form a roof or cladding assembly, or any other system. Criticality must be assessed at system level, not solely at the level of individual components, since it is the performance of the whole assembly that determines the safety risk. This is particularly essential if a product is specified based on performance as part of a wider system.
• Clear guidance on the boundary between manufacturer product information duties and the design and specification duties of architects, principal designers, and specifiers. This boundary is not currently clear.
• Specific guidance on how obligations apply to refurbishment and retrofit projects, where the existing structure, historic materials, and partial upgrades mean that a new product cannot always be assessed against standard modern tested assemblies. A proportionate approach for existing structures must be built into the guidance from the outset.
• There should be guidance for architects, principal designers, and specifiers which allows for the drawing of natural conclusions without dedicated testing. For instance, if a product has been fire tested against timber framing, it can be known that it will perform better against steel. Currently, liability concerns prevent this.
• Guidance on how products such as photovoltaic (PV) systems, solar thermal panels, and other items increasingly installed as part of a roof system affect the performance of the roofing assembly and how responsibility is allocated where these additions were not contemplated in the original system assessment. The interaction between renewable systems, like solar panels, and more traditional building systems must be considered, especially due to the potential risks to life posed by poorly installed or integrated electrical systems failing. Currently, the installation considerations for these systems are largely managed in silo by DESNZ without adequate interaction with MHCLG, despite the fire and safety risks they can pose.
• A clear statement or of the limits of contractor liability. Roofing and cladding contractors are often engaged without consultation after key product and design decisions have already been made. The guidance must make clear that a contractor cannot be held responsible for the intrinsic safety of a product, nor for design and specification decisions made by others earlier in the process, if they have not been consulted. Contractors can only be responsible for complying with specific installation instructions, identifying incorrect decisions where reasonable and escalating, and any mitigation measures set out to them by the principal designer and/or manufacturer.
• Guidance on product substitution must be explicit. The White Paper requires contractor attain approval from the principal designer before substitution, but the guidance must clarify what happens where no principal designer has been formally appointed, which is commonplace on smaller projects and RM&I work. It must also define what constitutes a 'substitution' as opposed to a like-for-like replacement, since this boundary currently lacks clarity and creates unnecessary liability exposure for contractors. Interplay with White Labelled products must also be explicit here.
• Guidance on competency requirements for approved installer schemes and what standards a contractor must meet to be considered competent to install products critical to safe construction must be included. Approved installer schemes should be explicitly listed and prioritise existing Competent Person Schemes which have strong records of success. The regulator must communicate with Competent Person Schemes early to ensure expectations are understood and any new influxes of installers looking to achieve certification are able to be anticipated.
• Industry must be formally consulted before any final methodology for determining critical products is published.

Timing and capacity

Guidance on the responsibilities associated with products critical to safe construction must be published at least 12 months before those obligations come into force. Given the volume of products and scenarios likely to be in scope within roofing and cladding, and the need for industry to train staff, amend processes, and potentially renegotiate contractual arrangements, a 12-month minimum should be considered a minimum.

Question 2: Do you agree that the above principles should underpin the licensing regime for CABs? Please explain your answer. Please outline how you think a licensing regime for CABs could work operationally.

NFRC Response: Yes, with significant qualifications regarding capacity, sequencing, and the current UKAS-BBA situation and what lessons must be learnt for the future.

NFRC supports the principle that all UK conformity assessment bodies operating in the construction products sector should be subject to a licensing regime overseen by the national regulator for construction products. The failures of oversight exposed by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry were serious, and a licensing regime with clear criteria and enforcement powers is a proportionate and necessary response. However, licensing must be designed in a way that it also encourages the creation of new regimes across the UK to compete with European testing and spread risk. 

The stated principles

We agree that the licensing regime should have clear criteria, support wider reforms, be proportionate, incentivise CABs to go beyond statutory minimums, and provide an escalating range of enforcement tools up to and including a ban from operating. We also support the principle that licence information should be publicly accessible, potentially through the construction library if and when that comes to pass.

Operations

We are deeply concerned about the capacity of the system, at regulator, UKAS, and CAB level, to absorb the additional demands of a licensing regime alongside the other substantial obligations being placed on all of these bodies simultaneously, both now and once the future regulatory regime is in place. The White Paper itself acknowledges existing capacity constraints, while proposing significant new responsibilities. These two realities must be reconciled before the licensing regime can be made operational. Money will need to be found somewhere. 

Of immediate and pressing concern to our members is the unresolved dispute between the BBA and UKAS. As of May 2026, the BBA is unable to progress direct engagement with UKAS to resolve the issues affecting its ability to issue new certifications. This has created a material bottleneck for manufacturers seeking to bring new products to market and created confusion about maintaining existing certifications. The licensing regime must not create a situation where these bottlenecks become commonplace. The national regulator for construction products must have the powers, and must use them, to ensure that disputes of this kind between the licensing body and CABs are resolved quickly, or at the very least, resolved in a manner that does not compromise the process but still provides some level of confidence to industry that does not impede work in the manner it recently has with the BBA. The current situation has also starkly made clear the dangers of an overreliance on a limited number of CABs. Diversification is essential.

•  Licence applications should be assessed within a defined, published timeframe. Indefinite processing queues would have a direct impact on the ability for bodies to successfully launch at needed scale as well as manufacturers' ability to place products on the market and would have a knock-on effect on the delivery of new homes and infrastructure. 
• The government should actively pursue mutual recognition arrangements with the EU to reduce duplication and ease the pressure on UK-based testing capacity.

Question 3: Do you agree that a national testing and research facility would lead to the highlighted benefits? Please explain your answer.

NFRC Response: Yes, subject to clear governance, realistic funding commitments, and a timetable that addresses the immediate capacity crisis.

NFRC supports the principle of establishing new public sector testing and research capacity. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry, the Morrell-Day Review, and NFRC Member businesses have identified the decline of public sector building science expertise as a systemic problem, and the consultation is right to address it.

We accept that a national testing and research facility would, if properly funded and governed, deliver the benefits identified in the White Paper: greater testing capacity for both manufacturers and regulators, an authoritative and independent source of technical expertise, better support for innovation, and a pipeline of specialist talent for the industry.

We strongly encourage the government to commit to a funding decision as soon as possible and to publish a realistic timetable, given that the construction of a fit-for-purpose facility would take a number of years. We would also caution that the national testing facility is not a short-term solution to the current testing capacity crisis. While it is under development, the government must maintain and expand access to existing private sector and overseas testing capacity to prevent industry grinding to a halt.

On partnership models, we support the idea of government partnerships with private laboratories and academic institutions. These arrangements can deliver capacity quickly without the lead time required for a new government-owned facility. We recommend that the government set out clearly how such partnerships would be governed, how impartiality of results would be guaranteed, and how intellectual property produced through such arrangements would be handled.

Question 5: Would there be a benefit to enabling employment protections, for individuals reporting risks, bad practices and non-compliance within their own organisation, to the national regulator for construction products?

NFRC Response: Yes.

NFRC supports the introduction of whistleblower employment protections for individuals who report construction product safety concerns or non-compliance to the national regulator for construction products. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry identified that information about the fire performance of cladding products was known, at various points, to individuals within relevant organisations who did not raise concerns externally. Employment protections are a well-established mechanism for addressing this problem in other regulated sectors.

However, we note that the value of such protections depends entirely on the practical accessibility and reliability of the reporting system. Protections must be clearly defined, and individuals must have confidence that the process will protect them before they will use it. They must also be sufficiently aware of the protections and the mechanisms for reporting. The regulator's reporting system must also be equipped to handle reports from individuals within complex supply chains, including SME employers where the power imbalance can be more acute than in larger businesses. 

We also flag the need for the reporting system to have a robust triage function to manage the risk of malicious, vexatious, or commercially motivated reports being used as competitive weapons against compliant businesses. A clear and well-publicised threshold for what constitutes a valid report, along with an appropriate right of response for the subject of a report before any adverse action is taken, is essential to maintaining trust in the system.

Question 7: Are there any specific roles or points where you think accountability is not clear? If yes, please explain your answer and include who should be responsible. 

NFRC Response: Yes, there are several significant areas of unresolved accountability. 

The manufacturer-designer boundary

The White Paper correctly identifies that where a manufacturer provides design advice in relation to the use of a product in a specific situation, the manufacturer takes on design responsibilities. In practice, manufacturers in the roofing and cladding sector are increasingly asked to provide detailed, project-specific guidance on system specification and installation, in part because specifiers are less confident, in part because liability concerns have markedly increased under the BSA, and in part because principal designers do not always have the product knowledge to make these decisions independently. The regulatory regime must make clear:

What level of advice triggers official designer status, so that manufacturers can make an informed commercial decision about whether to provide it or to what extent. 

• Whether and how manufacturers can limit the scope of any design responsibility they take on through contractual disclaimers or scope of service definitions.
• What competency requirements apply to manufacturers when they act as designers.

Without this clarity, manufacturers face unknowable liability exposure each time they provide technical guidance to a customer. This has the potential to either drive manufacturers to restrict the quality and specificity of the advice they provide, or to absorb costs associated with designer obligations that they are not currently resourced to fulfil. Neither outcome serves the objective of safer products and buildings.

Contractor accountability for substituted products

Paragraph 11.4.6 of the White Paper states that contractors bear responsibility where products are substituted 'with approval from the Principal Designer'. This raises two questions that remain unanswered:

• Is it the policy intention that products may only be substituted with Principal Designer approval?  
• Where the Principal Designer approves a substitution, what additional responsibilities does this approval impose on the contractor, if any? The White Paper does not clarify whether the contractor then assumes responsibility for the product's intrinsic safety, or only for its correct installation.

NFRC's clear position is that contractors should not be held responsible for the intrinsic safety of a product, nor for specification decisions made by others. Contractors can only be responsible for correct installation in accordance with the instructions and mitigation measures provided to them. The regime must explicitly state this, and guidance must make it workable in practice. There must also be more work done by industry and government to raise awareness about Principal Designer duties in sectors like RM&I where many contractors are taking on these roles without an adequate understanding of the duties they entail.  

Building owners and users

The White Paper places responsibilities on building owners and users to maintain and replace products. However, it does not appear to impose any corresponding duty on them to seek advice from appropriately competent parties before carrying out replacements. Without this obligation, there is a risk that building owners replace products without triggering the competency and product selection obligations that apply during original construction, potentially creating unsafe situations without anyone in the supply chain being aware. 

Contractors engaged after design decisions are made

Roofing contractors are regularly engaged at a stage in a project where product and design decisions have already been made by others. The reform must strengthen the requirements for early contractor engagement, ensure that design risk information is passed to contractors before they take on installation work, and make clear that contractors who are not involved in design and product selection cannot be held liable for decisions made before their engagement.

Question 8: Do you have views on appropriate lead times or transition periods relating to specific reforms set out in this white paper? 

NFRC Response: Current proposed timelines are not workable for much of the industry, particularly SMEs. NFRC has serious concerns about the proposed implementation timelines set out in the White Paper. We note that the consultation on the GSR proposes to bring regulations into force in late 2027, potentially as little as 18 months from now. For many of our members, particularly SMEs and/or those which may have had no prior engagement with a formal regulatory regime for their products, this will not provide adequate time to understand, prepare for, and implement compliance with the new requirements. 

GSR commencement date

NFRC does not consider a late 2027/early 2028 commencement date for the GSR realistic, for the following reasons:

• The national regulator for construction products will need to publish guidance and worked examples of risk assessment in line with GSR requirements. This guidance must be published at least 12 months before commencement, at the very minimum. Given that the consultation on the GSR closes in May 2026, and that the government will need time to consider responses, draft regulations, pass secondary legislation, and publish guidance, a 2027 commencement date leaves essentially no time for industry to prepare. We submit that no earlier than late 2028 is a realistic and responsible target.
• Many manufacturers who will fall under the GSR have no prior experience of a formal regulatory regime and will need substantial time to understand their obligations, appoint competent persons, and document their products and risk assessments. This is not simply an administrative exercise; for many smaller manufacturers it will require significant investment at a time where overheads are already being squeezed by an extremely challenging international and energy market.
• Standards currently being updated to reflect the EU-CPR 2024 regime will not be finalised for a number of years. The interaction between the updated designated standards regime and the GSR must be clear before the GSR comes into force. Implementation of the GSR in advance of this clarity creates the risk of businesses incurring compliance costs that they will then need to revisit as standards are updated.
• The government should recommit to at least 24 months' notice before any significant further changes to the recognition of CE marking, in line with the commitment previously made when the original deadline for CE marking was extended.
• The capacity of the national regulator for construction products, UKAS, and CABs must be assured before new obligations come into force. The lesson of the Gateway process under the Building Safety Act must be heeded: obligations without adequate regulatory capacity create gridlock, not safety.

Question 10: Do you have any views, evidence or insights regarding the impact that reforms might have regarding the costs and benefits to businesses, as well as any wider impacts? 

NFRC Response: 

Costs

There is a risk that compliance costs are passed on to consumers and clients in the form of higher product prices and project costs, which could affect the viability of the government's housing delivery programme. The government should factor this into its assessment. 

Benefits

NFRC accepts that a properly implemented and enforced regulatory regime for construction products will deliver significant benefits: greater confidence in the safety of products, a level playing field, better product information for specifiers and installers, and a reduced likelihood of building safety failures. These are real and important benefits, and NFRC supports pursuing them as a means of championing the good work our Member businesses do.

However, benefits will only be delivered if the regime is adequately resourced and enforced. A regulatory framework that places obligations on manufacturers, distributors, and contractors, but lacks the enforcement capacity to identify and sanction non-compliance, will disadvantage those who invest in compliance while benefiting those who do not. We emphasise that resourcing of the national regulator must be treated as a non-negotiable precondition, not an aspiration.

Question 11: Do you have any other useful information you wish to share that is not covered by your previous answers? 

NFRC Response: 

Mandatory installer competency requirements

NFRC advocates for mandatory competency requirements for the installation of roofing and cladding products, particularly for products that are critical to safe construction. Voluntary training schemes and competency frameworks, however well designed, have limited market penetration in a competitive sector where cost pressure is acute. A mandatory baseline, reflected in Approved Document 7 or equivalent guidance, is necessary to ensure that the benefits of product reform are not undermined by installation failures. This should be noted in wider discussion around the regulation of professions happening this year through a call for evidence on regulating professions and a license to build. 

We note that work is already underway through the Industry Competence Steering Group and sector-led groups in which NFRC is an active participant. Government should accelerate this work, adequately resource it, and commit to reflecting the outputs in mandatory regulatory requirements. 

The CCPI and avoiding duplication

The Code for Construction Product Information (CCPI) has established a model for product information transparency that is well regarded in our sector. Government should ensure that any new mandatory product information requirements under the GSR and CPR regimes are designed to be consistent with CCPI, so that manufacturers who are already CCPI-compliant do not face additional, duplicative obligations. Duplication of effort is particularly burdensome for SMEs. 

CE Marking

CE marks are about compliance, not safety. While the EU CPR regime is moving towards an increased focused on safety in some instances, NFRC Members were reliably concerned that an overreliance on CE marking will not necessarily guarantee safety.

Systems vs Products

It is critical that, as the Construction Product Reform department delves into the specifics of these policies the interplay and distinction between products and systems is adequately considered and understood.

Read NFRC's Response to General Safety Requirement Consultation here.